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Upshot: Enriching the parallel between transcendental phenomenology and 
enactivism, I briefly discuss the compatibility of the Buddhist perspective with 
Gallagher’s contribution to time-consciousness. Grounded in his meditative 
practice and heartfelt engagement with Buddhist philosophy, Varela de-
constructed representationalism and its underpinning metaphysical dualism, 
building up the generative concept of enaction. His approach has been deeply 
inspired by Madhyamika Buddhism, which describes time-consciousness as 
that double illusion that frames phenomena as either becoming or permanent. 
1. Shaun Gallagher’s target article, centered around Francisco Varela’s continuation 
of Edmund Husserl’s work on time-consciousness, elaborates on the embodied 
approach pioneered by Varela. The rigor of this analysis starts with the definition of 
Husserlian distinguishable-yet-inseparable moments: retention, primal impression, and 
protention. Then, towards the conclusion, the author intertwines them with an enactive 
approach to temporality, based on the mutual interdependence of such a threefold 
structure of time-experience. The precision and clarity of Gallagher’s article leave 
almost no space for critiques, re-enhancing a neglected theme in contemporary 
literature. Even though time shapes our lives with both intense and empty moments, it 
recedes ephemerally from our analysis, as we try to catch its essence. The implications 
of the target article retrieve classical unadulterated philosophical questions and deserve 
some further considerations. 
“Knife-edge” present transcendental deconstruction 
2. Gallagher’s article sets the stage of the “knife-edge present” deconstruction from 
its very beginning (§2): “Consciousness must in some way grasp more than the punctual 
now.” Then, in his enactivist account of time-consciousness (§§29-36), Gallagher points 
out the interdependency of primal impression, retention, and protention: “Our 
experience of the present is always dynamic […] in such a way that a focus on any one 
of the three components in isolation runs into an abstraction” (§29). Considering each 
factor per se reciprocally presupposes the other two factors in a circular way: “[I]f 
primal impression is part of the structure of the living present, it is itself structured in its 
relations to retention and protention” (§33). This brings Gallagher to discuss time-
consciousness’s phenomenological “fractal character”: as each block is acknowledged, 
it collapses into the “following.” As we grasp a primal impression based on protention, 
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it ends being held in retention, and so on; retention dissolves into protention, as “every 
living is living towards” (Husserl 1991: 313).  
3. Nowadays, Immanuel Kant’s philosophy finds little attention with respect to this 
theme. In Kant’s framework, any fact, to become meaningful, must match our a priori 
structure, which in turn predetermines it (Kant 1990). Given that the transcendental 
structure constitutes only selected aspects of the phenomenal world, time as an inner 
form of intuition cannot become the direct object of our conscious attention. 
Nonetheless, we perceive and conceive of things only insofar as they unfold in time. 
Husserl relied on Kantian refined conception, considering time neither as an objective 
fact existing in the world nor as a private, subjective projection. He inherited from Kant 
the view that both spatiality and temporality are a priori empty intuitions permeated by 
sensorial, a posteriori ones. Kant argued that the properties that we can assign to the 
object are nothing but the very preconditions for knowing the object itself, overturning 
the relationship between the knowing subject and the experienced object. However, he 
did not formulate a phenomenological reduction of time-consciousness, as Husserl did. 
With phenomenology, Husserl turned Kantian time from a pure intuition – as a non-
empirical representation – into a living, dynamic phenomenon that relies on the horizon 
of experience. Moreover, Husserl developed phenomenological methods, such as the 
epoché, in order to reduce experience to its minimal, invariant character. Building upon 
this, Varela then situated time-consciousness in an embodied process. Enactivism 
reminds us that we cannot access the objects per se but only those aspects of objects 
that are co-constituted by our ongoing cognitive activity (§17). This a priori structure is 
grounded in the embodied retention of all previous successful couplings, and circularly 
shapes and is shaped by its affordance possibilities.  
From passive to active perception and action 
4. Consider the Husserlian example of the temporal succession of melody (§2): the 
unitary, punctual essence of “duration blocks” of individual tones A-B-C. While the 
duration-blocks, in themselves, do not possess melody, if considered independently, 
melody arises out of the interplay of past retentions and occurring protentions as we 
listen to the blocks in continuation. Music is more likely to create temporal form while 
unfolding in time and co-originating with it: a melody is a melody only as it unfolds in 
time, and time does not exist outside of that melody. According to Husserl, the 
intentional act of hearing each appearing singular tone is simultaneously intertwined 
with the dynamic interplay of the “coming-to-be” and “about-to-be.” Overcoming Franz 
Brentano’s isomorphism, Husserl conceived a transcendental reconstruction of time as a 
somewhat passive immanent character of experience itself. Following the epoché 
reduction, the diachronic succession can be deconstructed in its transitory components, 
all immanent to the intentional bond: “[M]y retentional awareness of the just-passed 
note is not itself just past; it is part of the present structure of consciousness” (§9).  
5. Given that the threefold structure of time-consciousness unfolds through 
intentionality, the author concludes that consciousness itself, “is not simply a passive 
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reception of the present; it is not simply self-affective. It enacts the present” (§34). As 
our attention is driven towards the present moment, the linearity of the succession is 
undermined by the self-referential enactive character of the temporal stream: “[F]or 
Husserl temporal experience is not itself an object occurring in time, but neither is it 
merely a consciousness of objective time; rather it is itself a form of temporality” (§9). 
Embedding perception into action, Varela (1999: 272) shows how the act of viewing a 
multistable image “gives temporality its roots in living itself” (§16). The anticipatory 
apprehensiveness of the “not-yet” thus becomes complementary to the retention of the 
“just-past,” showing how we are “active perceivers, rather than passive listeners” (§16). 
Similarly, recalling James Gibson’s notion of affordance, Gallagher depicts 
intentionality as an embodied spatial protention in the action towards objects (§35). The 
“not-yet,” far from being a mere absence, is full of enactive possibilities that will be 
fulfilled or not “as our enactive perception trails off in retention.” In Khachouf, Poletti 
& Pagnoni (2013), we discuss, from an “embodied-transcendental” perspective, how the 
predetermined enactive architecture of an autopoietic organism dynamically structures 
its ecological niche, defining its Umwelt, intentional affordances, and world-view. 
6. Time-consciousness may relate to various inertial phases in the recollection of 
stored contents, enabling the interpretative activity of the sensorial input flow, in a self-
referential predictive anticipation (Gallagher & Allen 2016). For example, the localized 
activity associated with face processing biases subjects before the detection of a face 
rather than a vase during a decision task on Rubin’s ambiguous vase-face figures 
(Hesselmann, Kell & Kleinschmidt 2008). This finding fits with Varela’s idea of 
conscious self-referentiality as an embodied hierarchical process: in his hypothesis, 
neural dynamics unfold at multiple temporal scales. In Guido Hesselmann et al.’s 
example, the phase synchrony of neural discharges is first hypothesized to occur at 
lower levels within scattered sensorimotor assemblies, associated with the “pure 
present” character of the ongoing experience. These neural discharges are in turn 
recruited by higher-order assemblies that integrate their activity. The hierarchical 
inclusion of these assemblies in larger dynamic structures could represent a stage 
associated with the phenomenological threefold structure of the “living present” (Varela 
1999). Thus, Varela described the “living present” as a pre-narrative “pure present” 
encircled by a horizon of retention and protention, associated with higher-order neural 
phase synchronies unfolding at multiple temporal scales and modifying the present act 
of perception as “just past.” The transient phase locking of cell assemblies in neural 
synchronization goes conjointly with that constant modification of the present (Varela 
1995, in §20). 
Time-consciousness in Buddhism and the problem of dualism 
7. Acknowledging certain weak spots in Husserl’s methodology, Gallagher (1998) 
maintains that pre-noetic and hermeneutical factors (such as embodiment, language, 
historical effect, and intersubjectivity) should be integrated into it. Literature, art, 
cognitive psychology, and social sciences, he argues, may be useful in overcoming 
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intrinsic limitations of phenomenology, as they all encompass extra-intentional 
dimensions. However, to adequately meet this transdisciplinary challenge, Gallagher 
admits that new radical paradigms might be needed. These paradigms should involve 
the minimum of interactions between methodological reductions and metaphysical 
assumptions. 
8. In the enactivist approach (§17), intentionality is accompanied by prereflective 
awareness (Depraz, Varela & Vermersch 2000), which in turn is embedded in situated 
physiological processes (Lutz & Thompson 2003). Varela methodologically dissolved 
any objective, metaphysical stance on “a mind-independent reality”, showing the 
impossibility of being able to describe consciousness “within nature as it is supposedly 
described by our best scientific theories” (Bitbol 2002). Neurophenomenology 
encourages a transdisciplinary integration of extra-intentional, pre-noetic factors, 
starting by “clearing out” researchers’ minds. In fact, these factors can be considered as 
directly immanent in one's mind, given that it actively maintains intentional bonds with 
socio-cultural constructions such as language. Incorporating these factors as being co-
produced with the experience, the Buddhist contemplative practice, which is grounded 
in body-awareness, is supposed to unveil the intentional characters immanent to time-
consciousness. As reported in Gallagher’s article, Buddhism brought Varela to frame 
our immediate experience as a dynamical interconnection “within a finite segment of 
time” (§22). Later, in §24, referring to the double intentionality, Gallagher quotes 
Varela’s consideration of a “pre-reflective sense of the experiencing self”: certainly, 
Varela accessed it personally, scrutinizing Buddhist philosophy and practicing 
meditation.  
9. Following Varela’s example, neurophenomenology can be intended as a radical 
constructivist research program, matching the conceptual analysis with a profound, 
embodied, existential commitment (Vörös & Bitbol 2017, this issue). With respect to 
time-consciousness, meditation seemingly suspends the self-confirmatory loop of the 
predictive, transcendental process, including Gibsonian affordances (Khachouf, Poletti 
& Pagnoni 2013). In Buddhism, unreleased-stored reactions, often referred to as 
dispositions (Skt, samskaras) held in deep storehouse consciousness (Skt, alaya 
vijnana), are said to push forth attachments and consequent existential suffering (Skt, 
dukkha). The retention of these salient memories are said to show up through individual 
inclinations to act (Skt, vrittis and vasanas). That is why meditation is said to help us 
get rid of past impressions, purifying the ongoing dependent origination of time-
consciousness.  
10. Buddhist interdependent origination addresses time-consciousness and related 
problems head-on. For example, with refined logical arguments, Nagarjuna attempted to 
show how time has no self-existence, since it can never be grasped (Garfield 1995). In a 
less analytical way, Dogen defined being-time as a unified, co-emergent pure activity, 
since Being unfolds itself as beings, and time unfolds Being as beings (Kim 2000). In 
Dogen, Being and time are the activity of space-awareness, based on “forgetting 
oneself.” Such an interpretation takes on its full meaning only following the “letting-go” 
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gesture, reclaimed by Varela himself. Forgetting the “specious-present”, time structure 
can be reabsorbed into minimal activity. Letting-go both time-impression and concept, 
the Buddhist soteriology aims at getting rid of recorded retentions, which keep us in the 
threefold circle of retention-primal impression-protention, determining our personal 
worldview and thirst/desire (Skt, trishna), marked by karmic influences impressed in 
our beliefs and in our dualistic worldview. Dualism starts with the (pre-reflective) 
attitude separating ourselves from the supposed “external world”; hence, the core sense 
of “I” exists only insofar as its evidence is supported in its auto-confirmatory process 
based on salient retention-protention cycles that determine self-attachment. 
11. In both Hinduism and Buddhism, primary existential craving is said to shape this 
transcendental activity, building up the condition of suffering (Skt. dukkha), as 
impermanence (Skt. anitya) and self-emptiness (Skt, anatman) go unrecognised. 
Contemplative practices are supposed to allow that acknowledgement through refined 
analysis of the ongoing experience. Clearly, time-consciousness is radically at stake 
there and has to deal with our ego-centered interpretative framework. Considering the 
gap between the three components of time-consciousness, Madhyamika philosophers 
proposed a refined conception of time, filling the gap between the act of knowing and 
perceiving (Garfield 1995). As in Husserlian epoché, the attempt of Buddhist meditation 
is to collapse all interpretative inclinations towards the noetic side of intentionality. 
Trying to overcome the subjective dimension, its endeavor is to abandon ego-centered 
action-perceptions, a principle that was crucial in determining Varela’s own worldview. 
Conclusion 
12. Considering the contemporary recurrent naïve reduction of temporality to a linear 
discrete process through which neurophysiological data can be interpreted, time-
consciousness in all its phenomenological complexity deserves more nuanced 
elucidations. In both his deconstructive and generative intentions, Gallagher’s works 
(e.g., Gallagher & Varela 2003; Reinerman-Jones et al. 2013; Øberg, Normann & 
Gallagher 2015) bring important contributions to the constructivist approach, enriching 
transdisciplinary research. Neurophenomenology still deserves a deeper philosophical 
integration of phenomenology and meditation in order to access and reframe 
transcendental processes’ dynamics. 
13. Time-consciousness shows fruitful connections with many research topics, e.g., the 
predictive confirmations of the narrative-self in integrative clinical practice. 
Autobiographical-identity is sustained by self-referential thoughts triggered by past 
memories and consistent anticipatory patterns (Gallagher 2000). As reclaimed by 
Khachouf, Poletti & Pagnoni (2013: 8), the Default Mode Network (DMN) activation 
could be related to an activity that is “being prepared for the future.” This may be 
especially useful for what concerns the function of the DMN in enacting and looking 
out for environmental confirmation of an autobiographical-based model of narratives. 
Finally, as recommended in a conclusive footnote (§38), the complementary interplay of 
micro-phenomenology and meditation could improve Western scrutiny of 
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consciousness’s micro-dynamics (Petitmengin et al. 2017).  
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